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ABSTRACT

We present a challenge for Group of Twenty (G20) discussions that entails (1) greater
awareness of the role of non-fuel minerals in the global economy overall, but specifically in the energy sector; and (2) the introduction and acceleration of alternative energy sources and technologies. We focus on chemical battery energy storage, given
its prominence in all views and outlooks of energy futures, especially for mobility. We
present recommendations for G20 discussions and actions on battery materials, and
the crucial underlying supply chains for mineral commodities.
نســتعرض فــي هــذه الورقــة تحديــات لتناقشــه مجموعــة العشــرين تســتلزم1 :ـ وعيً ــا أكبــر بــدور المعــادن فــي
االقتصــاد العالمــي بشــكل عــام ،وفــي قطــاع الطاقــة علــى وجــه التحديــد -2 .إبــداء األولويــة إلــى مصــادر وتقنيــات
الطاقــة البديلــة وإســراع وتيرتهــا .نركــز هنــا علــى تخزيــن الطاقــة فــي البطاريــة الكيميائيــة ،بالنظــر إلــى أهميتهــا
فــي جميــع الــرؤى ووجهــات النظــر المتعلقــة بمســتقبل الطاقــة ،وباألخــص بالنســبة إلــى النقــل .كمــا نطــرح
توصيــات لتناقشــها مجموعــة العشــرين لتتخــذ إجــراءات بشــأن مــواد البطاريــات وسالســل اإلمــداد ذات
األهميــة الجوهريــة بالنســبة إلــى ســلع المعــادن.
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CHALLENGE

There is growing interest in non-fuel minerals, such as those used as materials for
battery energy storage in electric vehicle (EV) transportation and other applications.
Risk and uncertainty are inherent in non-fuel mineral sourcing, supply chains, and
supply–demand balances. Most non-fuel minerals are mined in economically weaker
countries, many of which have fragile economies. Thus, the import reliance is high
and large producers often monopolize the market. These dynamics are captured by
so-called mineral “criticality,” although the definitions, criteria, and methods thereof
remain inconclusive.
There is greater scrutiny of industry and governments in terms of ensuring environmental and social stewardship. There is scarce knowledge about lifecycle effects
such as from the “mines to wheels.” The currently used metrics—including end-oflife management—are fragmented. Given materials inputs, it is particularly unclear if
the combined lifecycle effects associated with “new” energy systems are an improvement over those associated with other conventional systems. The challenge is further
complicated when we include non-fuel minerals for the full suite of industrial and
human needs—that is, minerals to support life.
The present COVID-19 context adds complications. First, economic repercussions
have shined a light on the brittleness of global supply chains, with calls to diversify,
“re-shore,” or even build them anew.
Second, there exist idiosyncratic risks inherent to energy and minerals-related industrial operations, and companies, trade associations, and governments have been
struggling to manage them. This is especially true for remote and frontier operations
and/or those in emerging, developing, and fragile economies with inadequate public
health capacity.
Third, many non-governmental organizations and representatives of some governments are seeking to accelerate decarbonization in order to spur economic recovery
and restoration.1 While this goal may be well intentioned, building the capacity for it
entails serious obligations of taxpayer and sovereign resources. At the same time, the
slack utilization and lost revenues would burden legacy energy systems, and supply

1. McFarlane (2020) reports that governments have committed to roughly $12 trillion in recovery stimulus
worldwide—of this, about $583 billion is marked for “climate friendly” initiatives, and of this amount, $40
billion has already been funded and another $14 billion has been earmarked for EVs. General Motors alone
has announced a $20 billion capital investment target, set over several years, to accelerate production of
its battery-operated EV fleet. This investment would include support for U.S. supply chains, battery manufacturing, and labor (communication with GM senior personnel, March 3, 2020).
TASK FORCE 10. SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, WATER, AND FOOD SYSTEMS
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chain stresses, which are already in evidence, would increase. Thus, we believe that
scoping and preparation would be a better use of time and scarce resources than
acceleration.
Nevertheless, the Group of Twenty, or more commonly, the G20, should recognize
and address the important challenge associated with non-fuel mineral-based energy
transitions as well as sustainable, resilient raw materials inputs for overall economic
development and growth. As the international community continues to navigate oil
supply security risks, it must shift its focus to the equally demanding security risks
related to non-fuel mineral supply chains. The current COVID-19 pandemic further
exacerbates the existing risks and uncertainties and is expected to create new ones.
We expect these essential points to be included in G20 conversations.
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We propose five recommendations and actions for G20 engagement on non-fuel
minerals for future energy pathways.
Framing: Batteries for EVs and Battery Minerals and Materials
First, energy storage is integral to all “new” energy system schemes. Second, mobility
itself is complicated. This makes the electrification of transportation a useful focal
point of discussion. There exist many EV options, given the market and regional diversity in which EVs are sold. However, battery capacity and performance are primary,
which are a function of design and chemistry. They are a combination of minerals and
materials that enable charging and release of electricity over multiple cycles while
staving off degradation. Mobility has additional constraints of battery weight, safety,
and other characteristics that make a battery design more or less favorable.
For some EV models, the batteries constitute two-thirds to one-half of the entire
purchase cost. The lifetime cost of an EV also includes battery replacement, raising
questions of after-market value. However, the perceptions that batteries are “cheap”
make EVs attractive. The falling costs of batteries can be attributed to the prevailing
commercial lithium-based chemistry—where 60–70% of capacity comes from China.
Changes in battery chemistries, along with relocation and diversification of battery
production, bear implications for costs. Re-engineering batteries and their supply
chains would further affect labor markets and trade balances, raising attendant questions.
Countries with the largest light-duty fleets face the toughest hurdles for adoption. EV
batteries must meet performance criteria for consumer acceptance. EVs are not likely to be successful as “standalone” products if they are not affordable and desirable
without public (government) support to close the gap between customer preferences and performance.
Governments across jurisdictions and at different levels of governance are devising
policy/regulatory pushes to encourage, or even enforce, the electrification of transport (Foss and Zoellmer 2020). A common approach is to propose bans on conventional internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, or at least on the on sales of new ICE
vehicles, sometimes with aggressive targets for timing. Although no government has
enacted bans into law, many jurisdictions are attempting to couple EV market share
targets and buildout charging infrastructure.
In this regard, “range anxiety” captures a first-order performance priority. EV customers want to travel some distance before the batteries need to be re-charged. The en-
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ergy density of gasoline is still 100 times higher than that of the best lithium battery
designs (Schlachter 2012). In 2016, Argonne National Laboratory estimated that pure
battery EVs (BEVs) could be at par with equivalent ICE vehicles by 2045 (Vijayagopal
et al. 2016; Vijayagopal, 2016). Reduced vehicle weight and enhanced aerodynamic design would further increase engine efficiency. However, battery energy density (watt
hours per kilogram or W·h/kg) must advance along with motor power density (kilowatts per kilogram or kW/kg)—each metric will need to be roughly doubled, from 135
to 320 W·h/kg and 8.6 to 16 kW/kg, respectively.
Battery science is moving toward “sustainable” battery chemistry to achieve improvements. Such advances are likely to include new chemistries for responsive battery
management systems (new sensors with better state of health measurements), better understanding of degradation, and new designs (e.g., redox flow batteries) that
could be commercialized. However, commercial scaling is a hurdle.
Lithium, the preferred material for cathodes, is alluring for many reasons—mainly its
low weight and high specific energy. Grey (2019) discusses that leading battery scientists believe that basic re-designs are needed to obtain better energy density relative
to weight and thus prolong battery life, but the drive to improve performance puts
battery safety at risk.
Lithium is reactive, whereas cobalt improves stability. However, sensitivities around
cobalt extraction and supply have triggered a broader search for substitutes. Attempts to store more energy in lithium batteries increase the risks associated with
overcharging, overheating, short circuits, and other hazards. Lithium batteries are
also hazardous materials for shipping and cargo safety.
We also know that battery manufacturing is itself energy-intensive. Depending on
the energy source, battery production may be emissions-intensive too. According to
one early estimate, the assembly of a typical lithium battery requires 400 kW·h of energy for every 1 kW·h of energy with 75 kg of CO2 released (Grey 2019). Recent reviewers report higher values—nearly 500 kg of CO2 per kW·h of battery capacity (Ambrose
and Kendall 2016). Thus, a “Gigafactory” capable of, say, 24 GW·h of battery manufacturing could produce upward of 13 million metric tons of CO2 per year. In comparison,
all electronics manufacturing in the U.S. in 2017 produced 6 MMT.2

2. See https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-10/documents/electronics_manufacturing_2017_in�dustrial_profile.pdf.
T20 SAUDI ARABIA
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Beyond manufacturing, lifecycle effects also involve shipping, vehicle assembly, electricity sources for recharging, and end-of-life disposal and recycling. Manufacturing
inputs also entail the lifecycle effects of mining and mineral processing as well as the
associated supply chains. Thus, it is expected that there is greater acceptance now of
recycling batteries and other components as a prerequisite for sustainable transition
to electrified transportation (Messagie 2017).
The importance of linking energy and non-fuel minerals in strategic decision-making about energy systems cannot be overstated. As shown in Figure 1, oil disruptions
in the late 1960s through mid-1970s forced the convergence of energy and non-fuel
mineral commodities. The prices for energy fuels are a cost input for non-fuel minerals and materials, and vice versa. Further, mineral extraction and processing are energy-intensive, whereas energy production and delivery are resource-intensive. Thus,
convergence across commodities markets, supply chains, and prices implies that the
demand for minerals and materials for battery energy storage bear enormous implications for all industrial systems and activity worldwide.
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Figure 1. Energy and Non-Fuel Minerals: Price Indexes
Source: Authors, based on World Bank “Pink Sheet” Commodity Price Data; see https://www.
worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets
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Minerals and materials inputs for batteries have been extensively reviewed. An early,
prominent study by Armand and Tarascon (2008) offers a succinct summary of battery designs and environmental considerations (see Figure 2). Every mineral commodity that may be used to improve battery performance presents trade-offs across
a number of metrics, including extractive processes and toxicity.
Table 1. Battery Chemistries and their Effects
Battery Type

Features

Environmental impact

Ni–MH (established)

Low voltage, moderate energy density, and higher power density

Nickel not green (difficult extraction/unsustainable); toxic.

Applications: portable, large-scale

Not rare, but limited
Recyclable

Lead–acid (established)

Poor energy density, moderate power rate, and low cost
Applications: large-scale, start-up
power, stationary

Lithium ion (established)

High energy density, power rate,
cycle life, and costly
Applications: portable, possibly
large-scale

High-temperature cyclability limited
Lead is toxic, but recycling is efficient up to 95%

Depletable elements (cobalt) in most applications;
replacements manganese and iron are green
(abundant and sustainable)
Lithium chemistry relatively green (abundant, but
the chemistry needs to be improved)
Recycling feasible, but at an extra energy cost

Zinc–air (established)

Medium energy density and higher
power density
Applications: large-scale

Lithium–organic (future)

Lithium–air (future)

Magnesium–sulfur (future)

Mostly primary or mechanically rechargeable
Zinc smelting not green, especially if primary
Easily recyclable

High capacity and energy density,
but limited power rate; technology
amenable to a low cost

Rechargeable

Applications: medium- and largescale, with the exception of power
tools

Renewable electrodes

High energy density, but poor energy efficiency and rate capability;
technology amenable to a low cost

Rechargeability to be proven

Applications: large-scale, preferably
stationary

Renewable electrodes

Predicted: high energy density,
power density unknown, and cycle
life unknown

Recyclable

Excellent carbon footprint
Easy recycling

Excellent carbon footprint
Easy recycling
Small carbon footprint

Magnesium and sulfur are green
Al–CFx (future)

Predicted: moderate energy density
and power density unknown

Aluminum and fluorine are green, but industries
are not
Recyclable

Proton battery (future)

Predicted: all organic, low voltage,
moderate energy density, and power
density unknown

Green, biodegradable

Source: Based on Armand and Tarascon (2008).
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Grey and Tarascon (2016) further examine minerals for battery chemistries (see Figure 2), and find that resource abundance explains only a part of the phenomenon. To
build sustainable, resilient raw materials supply chains, commercial interests must
have access to sometimes-remote resources, engage in extraction using best practices, build facilities for refining and processing, and build logistics for shipping to
manufacturing points. Further, the quality of the ore grade and refined, processed
product take primacy. Not all minerals are subject to open, transparent trade and
pricing—indeed, few of them are. “Liquidity” or market depth (number of participants
and financial flows) to support open, transparent trade and pricing could be expanded, but only if barriers to resource access are reduced, robust supply chains are built,
and competitive procurement with price discovery are employed. Any variability in
these and many other conditions results in a most uneven global playing field for
both established minerals commodities as well as specialty minerals for advanced
technologies and uses. The most typical mineral criticality indicators reflect internal,
domestic imperatives of home governments ignoring many other parameters.3

3. Examples of different critical materials lists as well as definitions are found in Nassar et al. (2020) and
Sonnemann et al. (2020). See also the U.S. Department of Commerce’s strategic report A Federal Strategy
to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Mineral, Bauer et al. (2010), Fortier et al. (2018), Blengini
et al. (2017), and Fu, Polli, and Olivetti (2019).
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of cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which provides more than 50%
of global cobalt supplies from primary extraction (United States Geological Survey
2017). Frankel (2016) further notes:
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In summary, battery energy storage represents a significant source of new demand
for non-fuel minerals. We must improve public domain transparency in emerging
battery designs and chemistries along with related materials requirements. However,
intellectual property considerations should gain priority as well, as they pertain to
economic and trade discussions. Transparent, publicly accessible mineral production
data are crucial for effective decision-making and policymaking. Numerous such databases already exist,4 as do international forums that provide transparency in mineral production and availability as well as independent surveys.5 We need a better
understanding of energy and emissions intensities for more complete appreciation
of, and appropriate public policy and regulatory responses to, the consequences of
energy transition policies and imperatives.
The G20 should not consider itself immune to the urgency of better preparing future generations of engineers and scientists for the complete mines to wheels supply
chain lifecycle, and the equivalent for other energy and non-energy applications. This
would help to achieve secure and sustainable use of our precious, dwindling resources. Industry, government, and research and education community experts require
better understanding of lifecycle analyses, consequences, and management.
Recommendations and Actions
Recommendation 1: Include non-fuel minerals in G20 discussions. The G20 should
issue a public statement recognizing the criticality of non-fuel minerals for the global
economy and future energy pathways. The G20 member countries should:
• Provide reliable public domain information on non-fuel mineral resource assessments and production, criticality determinations and methodologies,
trade flows, and energy and non-energy industrial applications;
• Establish a portal for convening country data sources and links;

4. United States Geological Survey Minerals Commodity Summaries are published annually; see https://
www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/mineral-commodity-summaries. Minerals UK provides a similar service;
see https://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/. The World Mining Data site is maintained by the Government of
Austria under the auspices of the International Organizing Committee for the World Mining Congresses;
see https://www.world-mining-data.info/. These, and other, sources vary in their mineral coverage.
5. Two of these include the International Copper Study Group: World Copper Factbook 2019 (see https://
www.icsg.org/index.php/component/jdownloads/finish/170/2965) and the Extractive Industries Transpar�
ency Initiative, which deals with government revenue, but is a good example of international collaboration on transparency (see https://eiti.org/). Moats et al. (2019) offer independent data collection and
dissemination. Without the participation and disclosure of mineral-producing and -processing operators
and countries, there will always be significant missing data from some geographical locations. Further,
technical studies that do close such data gaps tend not to be widely publicized outside of technical
communities.
T20 SAUDI ARABIA
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• Incorporate key minerals market dynamics into crosscutting economic discussions;
• Foster transparency in energy and emissions intensities of mineral extraction,
processing, and battery manufacturing; and
• Recognize in policy summaries and statements the importance of open, free,
competitive, and international trade in minerals and materials.
• Finally, we also suggest a framework, as shown in Figure 4, for G20 discussions, recommendations, and actions as well as for ongoing monitoring.

Figure 4. Recommended Framework for the G20
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“End of Life” are integrated for that stage.
Source: CES, revised July 2020, used with permission.

Recommendation 2: The G20 should fund research to develop a uniform mineral
riticality index that combines sustainability, supply chain risk, and costeflectiveness of each member nation’s unique situation.
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Recommendation 2: The G20 should fund research to develop a uniform mineral criticality index that combines sustainability, supply chain risk, and cost-reflectiveness of
each member nation’s unique situation.
• 
G20 members should encourage research to scope and define common
metrics for criticality and, thus, foster international cooperation for common
approaches; and6
• The G20 should foster exchanges among and between countries, industries,
and research communities to facilitate and advance research concepts.
Recommendation 3: The G20 should commit to promote the transparency of critical
mineral production data, processing, and technology within and beyond its member
countries. Thus, the G20 member countries should:
• Emphasize on reliable, high-level, publicly accessible data as critical to good
decision-making and policymaking;
• Encourage replication of successful examples; and
• Engage international forums that provide transparency in mineral production and availability.
Recommendation 4: The G20 should engage relevant multilateral agencies to foster
technical collaborations. In this regard, key disciplines include geoscience, political
science, economics, and engineering (mining, metallurgical, geological, environmental, and systems). The common stakeholders include governments, global aid
agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Collaborations should foster analysis, build capacity, provide technical knowledge, and empower decision-makers in
resource-rich developing countries to sustainably develop critical mineral resources.
Thus, the G20 members should:
• Encourage technical collaborations that target countries lacking in capacity to manage and sustainably develop major deposits of critical mineral resources;

6. 
Examples of different critical materials’ lists and definitions are found in Nassar et al. (2020) and
Sonnemann et al. (2020). The U.S. Department of Commerce released the strategic report A Federal
Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Mineral. Also see Fortier et al. (2018), Blengini
et al. (2017), Fu et al. (2019).
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• Encourage members with significant expertise to share knowledge on mineral policy and science and technology for sustainable development of critical mineral resources (including minimizing environmental and social effects
of mining);
• 
Support the World Bank’s Climate Smart Mining initiative7 to help resource-rich developing countries benefit from the increasing demand for
minerals and metals, while ensuring their mining sectors are managed in a
way that minimizes the environmental and climate footprint; and
• Use networks such as the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories
and Technology Centers for fostering collaboration among and between
government, industry, and research communities for basic and advanced research and development, expanding capacity for minerals and materials, and
assisting with capacity building elsewhere in the world.

Recommendation 5: The G20 should commit to sharing the best practices for the extraction and recovery of critical minerals. Thus, the G20 members should:
• Join the governments of, for example, Australia, Botswana, Canada, Peru, and
the U.S. in the Energy Resource Governance Initiative to disseminate best
practices.8
• Engage the mining industry through the Global Mining Guidelines Group.9

7. S ee,https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/brief/climate-smart-mining-minerals-for-climate-action.
8. See https://ergi.tools.
9. See https://gmggroup.org.
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Disclaimer
This policy brief was developed and written by the authors and has undergone a peer
review process. The views and opinions expressed in this policy brief are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the authors’
organizations or the T20 Secretariat.
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